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I. INTRODUCTION
1

Since its revision in 1988, the federal mail fraud statute and its
2
accompanying “honest services” provision have been used together
3
to prosecute corrupt public officials and private employees. By
December 31, 1990, barely two years after § 1346 was passed, 1,561
state and local officials awaited trial on corruption charges, many of
4
which included mail fraud charges. The statute was used to convict a
5
local housing official who failed to disclose a conflict of interest and
to convict students who conspired with their professors to submit
6
plagiarized work. It is currently being used to prosecute a former
Alaska state legislator who concealed his dealings with an oil
company while lobbying his colleagues in the legislature to pass
7
legislation favorable to the oil company.
The circuit courts are divided on how to interpret § 1346, the

*2011 J.D./LL.M Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2006). The history of the federal mail fraud statute traces
back to 1872, when it was passed in an effort to prevent the use of the Post Office (now the
Postal Service) to further fraudulent schemes. For a brief overview of the statute and its history,
see Michael K. Avery, Whose Rights? Why States Should Set the Parameters for Federal Honest
Services Mail and Wire Fraud Prosecutions, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1431, 1434–35 (2008).
2. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (“For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to
defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest
services.”)
3. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1309 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting), denying cert.
to United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008).
4. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to
Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 154 (1994).
5. United States v. Hasner, 340 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2003).
6. United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 369 (6th Cir. 1997).
7. United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1248 (9th Cir. 2008), cert granted, 129 S. Ct.
2863 (2009).
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8

honest services provision. In a recent dissent to the Court’s denial of
9
certiorari to a Seventh Circuit case interpreting the section, Justice
Scalia expressed frustration that courts have not developed “some
coherent limiting principle to define what ‘the intangible right of
10
honest services’ is, whence it derives, and how it is violated.” The
dissent went on to caution that “this expansive phrase invites abuse
by headline-grabbing prosecutors in pursuit of local officials, state
legislators, and corporate CEOs who engage in any manner of
11
unappealing or ethically questionable conduct.”
Justice Scalia’s concerns may be addressed during the current
term of the Supreme Court. The Court, in granting review to
12
Weyhrauch v. United States from the Ninth Circuit, will decide
whether, to convict a state official of honest services mail fraud, the
government must prove that the defendant violated a disclosure duty
13
imposed by state law.
The Petitioner, Bruce Weyhrauch, argues that such a state law
violation is required, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that “the
vague language of § 1346 is a mandate to create a federal common
14
law of disclosure obligations of state officials.” The United States, as
Respondent, contends that the “federal crime of honest-services mail
15
fraud” should not be encumbered by a “state-law limiting principle.”
Though most federal crimes operate independently of state law, it
may be that the only way to limit the federal crime of honest-services
mail fraud is to require an independent state law violation. Such a
limitation would address compelling federalist concerns identified by
Weyhrauch and the Ninth Circuit. Thus, it is likely the Supreme Court
will not affirm the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in its entirety, but will seek to
limit the scope of § 1346.

8. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d at 1243.
9. United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008).
10. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
11. Id.
12. Weyhrauch v United States, 548 F.3d 1237, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2863 (2009).
13. Weyhrauch v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2863 (U.S. 2009). The Court will also address
honest-services fraud in the private context in United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596, cert. granted,
129 S. Ct. 2379 (2009). The Court in Black will have the opportunity to resolve a circuit split by
deciding the scope of § 1346 with regard to private actors, since § 1346 ostensibly applies to any
person. This case will not be discussed in this commentary.
14. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Weyhrauch v. United States, No. 08-1196 (U.S. Mar.
25, 2009).
15. Brief of Respondent at 6, Weyhrauch, No. 08-1196 (U.S. May 27, 2009) (emphasis
added).
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II. FACTS
Attorney Bruce Weyhrauch was an elected member of the Alaska
16
House of Representatives from 2002 to 2007. In 2006, VECO Corp,
an oil services company, was lobbying the House of Representatives
17
in opposition to increased oil taxes. On May 4, 2006, Weyhrauch
mailed a resume and cover letter to VECO’s CEO in which he
18
offered to provide legal services and representation to the company.
In hope of securing future employment, Weyhrauch voted in ways
favorable to VECO, lobbied other elected officials to vote similarly,
19
and supported additional legislation favorable to VECO.
Weyhrauch was indicted for “devising ‘a scheme and artifice to
defraud and deprive the State of Alaska of its intangible right to [his]
honest services . . . performed free from deceit, self-dealing, bias, and
concealment’ and attempting to execute the scheme by mailing his
20
resume to VECO.” Weyhrauch never actually obtained any
21
compensation or benefits from VECO.
The district court found that Weyhrauch was not required to
22
disclose his conflict of interest under Alaska state law. The
government argued at trial that evidence of Weyhrauch’s potential
ethical violations should nonetheless be admitted because such
evidence could be used to support an honest services fraud conviction
23
under federal law. The district court ruled otherwise, holding that
“any duty to disclose sufficient to support the mail and wire fraud
24
charges here must be a duty imposed by state law.”
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the first mail fraud statute to protect citizens
25
from deprivation of tangible assets, such as money or property.
Later, Federal appeals courts interpreted the scope of the mail fraud

16. Joint Appendix at 14, Weyhrauch, No. 08-1196 (U.S. Sep. 14, 2009).
17. Richard Mauer, Supreme Court Sets Date for Weyhrauch Arguments, ANCHORAGE
DAILY
NEWS,
Sept.
29,
2009,
available
at
http://www.adn.com/news/politics/
fbi/weyhrauch/story/954429.html.
18. Joint Appendix, supra note 16, at 23.
19. Id. at 19.
20. United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Weyhrauch’s
indictment).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1240.
23. Id.
24. U.S. v Kott, 2007 WL 2572355, *6 (D. Alaska 2007).
25. Avery, supra note 1, at 1435 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870)).
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statute to include deprivation of intangible rights, such as the right to
26
honest services. The Supreme Court scaled this interpretation back
27
considerably in McNally v. United States. In addressing the question
of whether § 1341 criminalized the deprivation of the public of honest
services, the Court held that the statute was limited to the protection
28
of property rights. The Court noted nothing in the statute to indicate
that Congress intended to diverge from the common understanding of
29
the term when it enacted § 1341. The following year Congress
enacted § 1346, effectively overruling McNally and extending the
definition of fraud to include “a scheme or artifice to deprive another
30
of the intangible right of honest services.”
Section 1346 has a rather sparse legislative history. The statute was
31
passed as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Representative
John Conyers stated that the “amendment restores the mail fraud
provision to where that provision was before the McNally decision. . . .
This amendment is intended merely to overturn the McNally decision.
32
No other change in the law is intended.” After the Bill’s passage,
Senator Biden explained that the amendment was intended to
“reinstate all of the pre-McNally case law pertaining to the mail and
33
wire fraud statutes without change.” The clearest expression of
Congress’s intent, therefore, was merely to overrule McNally and
reinstate the pre-McNally line of cases. This effectively reestablished
the pre-McNally precedent in the Supreme Court as well as in each of
the circuit courts. The true meaning of § 1346, therefore, turns on
whether the pre-McNally line of cases supported a federal commonlaw definition of honest services.
The circuit courts are split over the scope of the honest services
34
doctrine. The Third Circuit has adopted a broad rule, requiring the
government to prove that a public official violated a fiduciary duty

26. Id. See also United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1153 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he statute
is ‘quite broad’ and ‘generally proscribes “any scheme or artifice to defraud” which in some way
involves the use of the postal system.’” (quoting United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 534
(3d Cir. 1978))).
27. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
28. Id. at 360.
29. Id. at 351.
30. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West 2006).
31. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as
18 U.S.C. § 1346).
32. 134 CONG. REC. H11108-01 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
33. 134 CONG. REC. S17360-02 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (statement of Sen. Biden).
34. United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2008).
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specifically established by state or federal law. The Fifth Circuit
requires the government to prove an independent state law
36
violation. None of the remaining circuits apply a state-law limiting
principle, but they differ substantially in how a federal standard is to
37
be applied.
The Fifth Circuit is the only circuit that explicitly employs the
38
state-law limiting principle. Echoing the Supreme Court’s concerns
in McNally, the Fifth Circuit was concerned that § 1346 would
promote overreaching by federal prosecutors into state and local
39
40
public ethics standards, thus posing a threat to federalism. The First
Circuit has stood out as the most prominent critic of the state-law
41
42
limiting principle, having repeatedly rejected it in its rulings. The
First Circuit requires that an official’s misconduct involve more than a
43
mere conflict of interest to support a conviction. The Tenth and
Eighth Circuits have held that a public official’s breach of duty must
44
be material and accompanied by fraudulent intent. The Seventh
Circuit takes a unique approach and has enunciated what it labels the

35. United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 116–117 (3d Cir. 2003).
36. Brumley, 116 F.3d at 734–35 (“Stated directly, the official must act or fail to act
contrary to the requirements of his job under state law.”)
37. See Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d at 1244 (“The majority of circuits . . . have held that the
meaning of ‘honest services’ is governed by a uniform federal standard inherent in § 1346,
although they have not uniformly defined the contours of that standard.”).
38. See Brumley, 116 F.3d at 734–35 (“Stated directly, the official must act or fail to act
contrary to the requirements of his job under state law.”).
39. See id. at 734 (“We find nothing to suggest that Congress was attempting in § 1346 to
garner to the federal government the right to impose upon states a federal vision of appropriate
services—to establish, in other words, an ethical regime for state employees.”).
40. See id. (“Such a taking of power would sorely tax separation of powers and erode our
federalist structure.”).
41. Avery, supra note 11, at 1439.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 726 (1st Cir. 1996) (“In general, proof of
a state law violation is not required for conviction of honest services fraud.” (citing United
States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 759 (1st Cir. 1987))); United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 55
(1st Cir. 1998) (noting that a public official’s “affirmative duty to disclose” may stem from
general common law fiduciary duties); United States v. Sawyer, 239 F.3d 31, 41–42 (1st Cir.
2001) (holding that the government need not show a state law violation to go forward in
prosecuting the defendant for honest-services mail fraud).
43. See United States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 298–99 (1st Cir. 2008) (“The issue could be
pertinent here if the government in this case had chosen to proceed on the theory that a conflict
of interest alone . . . was a basis for conviction.”).
44. Id. See also United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 667 (10th Cir. 1997) (“We agree
with the Eighth Circuit, however, that § 1346 must be read against a backdrop of the mail and
wire fraud statutes, thereby requiring fraudulent intent and a showing of materiality.”); United
States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 442 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[P]rior intangible rights convictions involving
private sector relationships have almost invariably included proof of actual harm to the victims’
tangible interests.”).
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45

“misuse-of-position-for-private-gain
limitation.”
Under
this
limitation, to prove an honest-services mail fraud violation, the
government must prove that a public official misused or intended to
46
misuse her office for private gain by use of the mail.
IV. HOLDING
While the Ninth Circuit ultimately declined to adopt the state-law
47
limiting principle, it noted that the Brumley decision addressed all of
48
the various federalist concerns by doing so. The Brumley holding
sets clear boundaries for federal honest-services fraud liability by
limiting its scope to preexisting state law, thus preventing federal
49
overreaching into state affairs. The court also noted that a state-law
limiting principle places redress for corruption in the hands the state
50
and local political process rather than federal prosecution.
The Ninth Circuit relied on the general proposition that the preMcNally line of cases generally did not require an independent state
51
law duty of honest services. In forming its rule, the court attached
52
this proposition to the rule of Badders v. United States, which
identified Congress’s affirmative power to prevent the use of the mail
in furtherance of fraudulent schemes, whether Congress has the
53
power to prohibit the particular scheme in question or not.
Additionally, due to the interdependent relationship between state
and federal policy, Congress has a legitimate interest in ensuring that
state policymakers and regulators, in failing to perform their services
54
honestly, do not frustrate the goals of federal policies. Such an
55
interest may be protected by the federal fraud statutes.

45. See United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[C]ourts have felt the
need to find limiting principles, and ours has been that the ‘[m]isuse of office . . . for private gain
is the line that separates run-of-the-mill violations of state-law fiduciary duty . . . from federal
crime’.”) (citing United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1998)).
46. See id. at 708 (“Showing misuse for private gain means showing an intent to reap
private gain; it is well established that a fraudulent scheme that does not actually cause harm is
still actionable.”).
47. United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2008).
48. Id. at 1244.
49. Id. at 1244–45.
50. See id. at 1245 (“[T]o the extent the honest services doctrine is intended to ensure
public officials act ethically, elected state officials are accountable to their constituencies, who
can punish dishonest or unethical conduct directly at the ballot box . . . .”).
51. Id. at 1246.
52. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393 (1916).
53. Id.
54. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d at 1246.
55. Id.
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In declining to adopt the state-law limiting principle, the circuit
56
court cited United States v. Louderman, which held that state law
plays no role in a court’s determination whether a federal fraud
57
statute has been violated. The court found no indication that
Congress meant to make the meaning of the term “honest services”
58
dependent upon state law. Moreover, the court identified a
potentially troubling inconsistency in conditioning the mail fraud
statute on state-law violations: “conduct in one state might violate the
mail fraud statute, whereas identical conduct in a neighboring state
59
would not.”
V. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit assessed the state-law limiting principle as
applied by the Brumley court to § 1346 with substantial approval, yet
the court ultimately rejected it on jurisprudential grounds.
Determining that Ninth Circuit precedent did not support its
adoption, the court instead adopted a uniform federal standard in its
interpretation of § 1346.
A. The State-Law Limiting Principle
The Fifth Circuit is the only circuit court to embrace fully a statelaw limiting principle, and its holding in Brumley was cited with
approval by the Ninth Circuit. Were the Supreme Court to adopt a
state-law limiting principle, it would likely follow the model outline in
Brumley. Because mail fraud has so frequently been used to
prosecute state and local officials in corruption cases, the Court may
prefer to adopt a model that respects more traditional principles of
60
state sovereignty and federalism. Brumley rejected interpreting §
1346 as a means by which the federal government could impose and
61
enforce standards of good government upon the states. The decision
62
was strongly federalist, as it would protect against the “danger to
state sovereignty that results when the federal government is given

56. United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1978).
57. Id. at 1387.
58. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d at 1245–46.
59. Id. at 1246.
60. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private
Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427, 428–29 (1998) (discussing United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995)).
61. United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 735 (5th Cir. 1997).
62. See Coffee, supra note 60, at 448 (discussing Brumley’s holding and impact).
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carte blanche to prosecute individuals for honest services mail and
63
wire fraud in connection with state or local public officials.”
Adopting a federal common-law standard and allowing the
federal government to determine both the meaning of “honest
services” and prosecute individuals who do not provide such “honest
services” may constitute overreaching into state affairs on the part of
64
the federal government. Michael K. Avery has argued that although
federal prosecution of public corruption is a necessity, at some point
“pervasive federal authority threatens to trample the sovereignty
65
afforded to the states by the federalist structure of the Constitution.”
Avery argued that the original rationale for federal prosecution for
honest-services mail fraud in connection with state and local public
corruption was simply the inability of the states to prosecute such
66
matters themselves due to their limited judicial resources. So
constructed, § 1346 is really intended to provide federal prosecutorial
support for state and local ethics standards, rather than to import
federal ethics standards into the state and local political processes. In
this way, the two bodies of law complement each other and the
potential geographical inconsistency in enforcement identified by the
Ninth Circuit may be less of a concern.
B. The Uniform Federal Standard
The Ninth Circuit declined to adopt the state-law limiting
67
principle, despite its approval of Brumley. In an attempt to deflect
criticism, the court noted that “[a] federal action based on a valid
constitutional grant of authority is not improper simply because it
68
intrudes on state interests.” If the court was correct that § 1346 does
69
not refer to state law, and that should § 1346 impose a general duty
of honesty owed by public officials to their constituents, there would
70
be no justification for imposing a state law limitation thereupon. The
question then becomes one of Congressional intent. It is possible that

63. Avery, supra note 1, at 1456.
64. Id. at 1455.
65. Avery, supra note 1, at 1457.
66. See id. at 1456–57 (“[T]he rationale for these prosecutions is that the states would
prefer to prosecute these crimes, but due to their incapacity to do so, federal enforcement is
necessary.”).
67. United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008).
68. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ( “[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.”).
69. Id. at 1245–46.
70. Id.

88

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 5:80

Congress has an interest in ensuring the honest behavior of state
officials merely because state and federal policy affect one another, as
71
the Ninth Circuit postulates. Section 1346 would then just be
Congress’s attempt to put that interest into legal effect. This,
however, clearly implicates the federalist concerns raised by the Fifth
Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in effect created a federal common-law
crime of honest-services mail fraud that was independent of any state
ethics laws. The Seventh Circuit called such a federal common-law
72
crime “a beastie that many decisions say cannot exist.” At least one
commentator argued that such a creation is entirely superfluous and
that Congress likely meant to refer to state law governing public
73
officials’ conduct when it referred to the right to honest services. The
Supreme Court has thus far refused to recognize any federal criminal
74
common law. In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A., the court stated flatly, “there is no federal common
75
law of crimes.”
The holding in Weyhrauch, however, has the advantage of
uniformity. Had the Ninth Circuit adopted the state-law limiting
principle, it would effectively sanction a state power to nullify a
federal statute: were a state not to enact any laws protecting the
public’s right to honest services from their elected representatives, §
1346 would have no effect in that state. Moreover, corrupt public
officials could evade federal prosecution by conducting illicit business
out of state, resulting in a kind of corruption arbitrage.
VI. ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION
A. Arguments
Weyhrauch argues that the Court should adopt a limiting principle
similar to that in Brumley because § 1346 does not authorize the
federal government to prosecute state officials for failing to disclose
conflicts of interest that do not violate state law. Primarily,

71. Id. at 1246.
72. United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 654–55 (7th Cir. 1998).
73. George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption?, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225,
283 n.491 (1996).
74. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) (noting that “we are not in the freewheeling days antedating Erie v. Tompkins”) (citation omitted).
75. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181
(1994).
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Weyhrauch argues that the phrase “scheme or artifice to defraud” in §
1346 evidences a legislative purpose to impose liability solely for
76
violations of state disclosure laws. Because the crime punishes public
officials who deprive the public of honest services, Weyhrauch
contends that “[c]ommon sense would dictate that absent a clear,
affirmative duty . . . to disclose particular information” must exist
77
before a local public official can be charged with a federal crime.
Weyhrauch also argues that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of §
1346 violates three canons of statutory construction: the clear
statement rule, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, and the rule
78
of lenity. Under the clear statement rule, where an interpretation of
a federal statute would upset the balance between federal and state
power, the Court requires “unmistakably clear” statutory language
79
before it will adopt such an interpretation. Weyhrauch argues that
the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of § 1346 requires federal courts to
create new federal common law “from scratch,” and that such a
reading is unsustainable due to a lack of unmistakably clear statutory
80
language authorizing such a mandate. Weyhrauch also argues that
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance compels a rejection of the
Ninth Circuit’s reading of § 1346, because such a reading might render
81
the statute void for vagueness. A statute may be held to be void for
vagueness if it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or
82
Weyhrauch
encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”
argues that the disclosure obligations imposed by the Ninth Circuit’s
holding would not provide a person of ordinary intelligence with fair
notice because “it does not say what ‘honest services’ may be, or when
83
they are withheld deceitfully.”
The United States supports the Ninth Circuit’s reading of § 1346,
contending that prosecution under § 1346 does not require an

76. See Brief for Petitioner at 15, Weyhrauch v. United States, No. 08-1196 (Sep. 14, 2009)
(“Where Alaska itself has enacted detailed provisions on the ethical and disclosure duties of its
officials, the violation of some as yet unidentified and broader federal common law duty can
hardly be deemed fraudulent.”).
77. Id. at 16.
78. Weyhrauch’s rule of lenity argument is brief and supplemental and shall not be
discussed in this commentary.
79. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 76, at 17.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 19.
82. Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008)).
83. Id.
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independent state law violation. The United States advances two
principal arguments: that the specific language of § 1346 was
deliberately chosen by Congress to reject the need for an independent
85
state law violation, and that the pre-McNally line of cases § 1346
reinstated held that honest-services mail fraud does not require a
86
violation of state law.
The United States argues that Congress employed the phrase “the
intangible right of honest services” as a term of art, intending to
invoke the pre-McNally definition of honest-services mail fraud,
which, the Government contends, does not require a state law
87
88
Citing McDermott International v. Wilander, the
violation.
Government notes that where Congress directly overturns a decision
of the Supreme Court and in doing so makes use of a specific term
from that decision, that term is deemed to have its established
89
meaning. Here, since the phrase “the intangible right of honest
services,” as used in the pre-McNally line of cases, did not require an
independent state honest services law, that same phrase as used in §
1346 would similarly lack such a requirement.
Before McNally, the courts considered a failure to disclose a
conflict of interest concerning official action to be honest services
90
fraud. Because § 1346 reinstates that line of cases, the United States
contends that § 1346 also reinstates the general theory of liability for
91
honest services fraud that existed before McNally. The brief for the
United States also contains a detailed and informative review of the
statute’s legislative history, noting that the original draft of what
would eventually become § 1346 did contain references to state law as
92
These
requirements for prosecution under additional provisions.
references, however, were not incorporated into the final honest-

84. Brief for Respondent, supra note 15, at 11.
85. See id. at 12 (“When Congress enacted Section 1346, it employed language derived
directly from McNally and the line of authority that McNally rejected.”).
86. Id. at 15.
87. Id. at 12.
88. McDermott Int’l v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991).
89. Brief for Respondent, supra note 15, at 16.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 19 (“[A]n individual ‘who fails to disclose material information’ can commit
fraud through his silence if he has ‘a duty to [disclose]’ that information.” (quoting Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980))).
92. The Department of Justice, which had drafted the proposal, initially included
additional provisions which would have allowed for longer sentences for violations of state
honest-services laws as well as for schemes specifically targeted to disrupt the election process
through means violative of state law. Brief for Respondent supra note 15, at 22–23.
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93

services provision.
Additionally, representative Conyers, who
presided at the hearing at which the Department of Justice proposed
its version of § 1346, stated that the statute would reestablish that an
honest-services scheme to defraud was not dependent upon a state94
law violation.
While Weyhrauch’s arguments are sensible and even somewhat
persuasive, they are contradicted by the legislative history of § 1346.
Weyhrauch neatly identifies many of the difficulties which the Ninth
and Fifth Circuits sought to resolve, like the potential inter-state
irregularity in enforcement as well as the potential for vagueness.
However, the United States hews more closely to the actual statutory
language and makes effective use of the statute’s legislative history.
Because § 1346 was expressly enacted to reinstate the pre-McNally
line of cases, a body of law which uniformly rejected the need for an
independent state law violation for honest-services fraud prosecution,
the statute’s purpose should be clear. Additionally, the fact that
references to state law were deleted from the statute is strong
evidence that Congress intended the statute to operate independent
of state law; this is strong support that Congress identified a federal
interest in all public officials, state or otherwise, performing their
duties honestly.
B. Disposition
While the United States’ arguments are authoritative,
Weyhrauch’s argument is strongly in line with the Fifth Circuit’s
Brumley decision. Thus, while legal precedent and the current trend
amongst the circuit courts toward a federal common-law standard
would drive the Court to affirm the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the
concerns identified by Weyhrauch and the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
cannot and should not be ignored. Thus, the Court is not likely to
affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Instead, it will probably adopt a
principle that limits honest services mail fraud in some substantial
way, potentially incorporating the need for an independent state law
violation in the model of Brumley. The Supreme Court has been
95
reluctant to create new federal common law. Justice Scalia already

93. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 15, at 22 (“[T]he text defining those offenses did
not refer to state law, and the Department [of Justice] made clear that ‘proof of the elements of
a State offense would not be required’.”).
94. Id. at 23 (quoting United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1361 (4th Cir. 1979)).
95. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 17 (listing instances in which the
Supreme Court has declined to create new federal common law). See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
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signaled his support for limiting the scope of the honest-services
96
doctrine, possibly to the extent of a state-law limiting principle.
The Court will probably seek to resolve the federalist concerns of
the Fifth Circuit, especially given the strong support of the Brumley
97
decision offered by the Ninth Circuit. It is possible that the Ninth
Circuit, by citing the Brumley decision with such approval yet
declining to adopt the state-law limiting principle for precedential
reasons, was signaling to the Supreme Court that it would prefer to
incorporate the Brumley rule had it the power to do so. Additionally,
the facts of Weyhrauch provide grounds for the Court to limit the
scope of § 1346, as Alaska state law does not mandate disclosure of
conflicts of interest. This case forces the Court to grapple with the
problem Justice Scalia recently identified: “Is it the role of the Federal
Government to define the fiduciary duties that a town alderman or
98
school board trustee owes to his constituents?” The federal
government has prosecuted Bruce Weyhrauch for acts that, while
unethical, are not illegal under Alaska state law. In fact, as
Weyhrauch’s brief contends, the Alaska legislature is not expected to
be a professional legislature, having only a 120-day session per year so
that state officials may seek other employment during the remainder
99
of the year. The possibility that an Alaska legislator would seek
employment while serving is less outlandish than it might be in a state
with a more professional legislature. The imposition of a new federal
common law crime of honest services fraud might simply impose a
duty on the legislators of Alaska that its citizens may simply not want.

373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) (signaling the court’s reluctance to create federal common law); United
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 n.6 (1997) (“Federal crimes are defined by Congress, not the
courts.”) (citing United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 939 (1988))).
96. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (“It is one thing to enact and enforce clear rules against certain types of corrupt
behavior . . . but quite another to mandate a freestanding, open-ended duty to provide ‘honest
services’—with the details to be worked out case-by-case.”).
97. See United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Fifth
Circuit’s state law limiting principle, which the district court adopted, addresses all of these
[federalist] concerns.”).
98. Sorich, 129 S. Ct. at 1310 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 76, at 18.

